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Abstract
Advanced Disposal Fees (ADF) are rather popular in waste management policies, but they
cease any waste reduction e¤ort at the household level. We propose a waved ADF policy which
enhances this system by giving to the households the possibility to sign a waste reduction
contract in counterpart of a lower fee. These contracts satisfy an incentive, a budget balancing
and a participation constraints. For these feasible contracts, we show that this enriched ADF
policy is welfare improving and always induces a waste reduction e¤ort.
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1 Introduction
For the last few years, environmentalists and policy makers have focused on increasing attention
to the question of waste management (see for instance Jenkins [9], Dinan [5] or Fullerton and
Kinnanan [6]) and it is now largely recognized that consumption generates an increasing amount
of garbage, the handling of which induces a growing social cost. From that point of view,
it becomes obvious that the households, acting as Citizens, should participate in the waste
management programs or at least have enough incentives to do so. In fact, even if this activity
is more or less e¢ cient according to the commodity under consideration (see Palmer and al
[12] or Jenkins and al [10]), it is always cost reducing especially if the agents are heterogeneous
with respect to the evaluation of the cost of their e¤ort. This conviction largely motivated the
per bag pricing (see Fullerton and Kinnanan [7]) and is essential for policies which one bets on
residential curbside recycling programs or promote a policy for green design (see for instance
Fullerton and Wu [8], Walls and Palmer [15], Calcott and Walls [1], [2]).
Yet, the behavior of the households is not often directly observable. This frequently induces
ine¢ ciency and leads to second best policies. To be more precise, if we refer for instance to
the work of Choe and Fraser[3], [4] or Shinkuma[13], it is clear that a Disposal Fee (DF for
short) policy, i.e. a charge based on the amount of waste, increases the risk of illegal dumping or
at least requires the introduction of an incentive scheme which prevents this unpleasant event.
In France, this type of nancing for waste management which consists in making pay the user
according to the quantity of waste that he throws, starts to develop: about twenty of localities
(according to ADEME) adopted this kind of incentive fee. The e¤ects, in these localities, are
an increase in the e¤orts of sorting as well as an increase in the quantities of waste that can be
recycled at the expense of residual waste. Moreover, uncivil behaviours do not seem signicant
and are obviously limited in time but not ineluctable.
However, in order to avoid the perverse e¤ects associated with this type of pay as you throw
nancing, the policy makers can decide to directly include the waste management cost in the
price of the commodity by implementing an Advanced Disposal Fee (ADF for short) policy.
For instance the European Directive (2002/96/CE) institutes the ADF system on electrical
and electronic equipment and prompts all European countries to transpose it in her national
law systems like in France by the decree n2005-829 of July 20th, 2005. Indeed, in France,
since November 15, 2006, 4 eco-organizations deal with removal and treatment of electric and
electronic equipments collected selectively, for producers who adhered to them. Consumers can
bring back to the distributors used equipment when they purchase a new one. However, for the
purchase of new equipment (refrigerators, computers, mobile phone. . . ), the consumers must
pay an eco-contribution intended to cover the costs of the new operations of collection and
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recycling of this waste. This amount can vary, for example, from one-cent euro for a mobile
phone to several euros for a television or a computer. A label, fastened on each new material,
indicates the cost of its recycling.
This suspicion which motivates the ADF system however denitely annihilates any incentives,
at a household level, to participate to a waste management program. This is for instance not
the case with a DF policy associated, when available, to a deposit-refund system. It even
prevents illegal disposal (see Palmer and Walls [11]). For the more general class of durable
goods, Shinkuma [14] still argues that an ADF policy is less e¢ cient than a DF one. In this
case, an ADF policy reduces the incentives to repair the commodity and depresses the second
hand market. It follows an excessive consumption and a larger disposal cost in respect to the
social optimum.
Our argument against a crude ADF policy is however slightly di¤erent. We simply say that if
some households are willing to participate in a waste management program and perhaps obtain
some nancial compensation, we should not destroy these incentives by implementing a crude
ADF system. On the contrary, we should implement a system which enriches this one by waving
the disposal fee in counterpart of the waste reduction e¤ort. We call this a waved ADF system
(wADF) and we argue that such a wADF contract induces a double social gain especially when
the agents are heterogeneous with respect to their desutility of their e¤ort and their willingness
to pay.
In fact, it is immediate that the buyers for which the desutility induced by the waste reduction
e¤ort is compensated by lower acquisition cost of the commodity surely participate in the waste
reduction program and even improve her situation. But we can still go a step further by observing
that any price cut in counterpart of a waste management e¤ort gives the opportunity to new
consumers to enter the market. Loosely speaking, poorer and environment friendlyconsumers,
i.e. characterized by a lower willingness to pay and a small desutility of waste reduction e¤ort,
are, under a wADF system, able to have access to the good under consideration. This again
increases the welfare.
The reader surely objects that everybody would have an incentive to accept this waste
reduction contract, to take the money and to dump her waste illegally. This is why we also
introduce a monitoring policy which checks the execution of the terms of the contract and we
show that even under this incentive constraint our wADF policy is more e¢ cient than a standard
ADF system.
To be more precise, we take a standard ADF system and we give to the consumers the
opportunity to sign a waste management contract. Consumers who accept the contract will
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be equipped with dustbins of di¤erent colours to sort their waste. We could also imagine, as
it is the case in some French cities like those of the Communauté de communes de la Porte
dAlsace, than these bins are provided with a electronic chip which allow to weigh the amount
of the waste contained in these bins. Thus, this one prescribes on the one hand a decrease in
the amount of waste in counterpart of price cut on their consumption but, on the other hand,
relies on a monitoring policy characterized by a probability of control and a ne which is equal
to the social cost of illegal dumping. The main purpose of this paper is to design this contract in
a way to maximize the welfare and to show that this wADF system strictly dominates a crude
ADF one.
But in our second best world, all contracts of that type cannot be implemented. That is why
we restrict our attention to a subset of feasible contracts which are (i) budget balancing in the
sense that the global waste management costs are covered, (ii) satisfy a participation constraint,
i.e. at least one agent is willing to adopt the contract and (iii) incentive compatible, i.e. induces
no illegal dumping. After having identied these feasible contracts, we study their properties in
term of welfare.
We essentially show that a social planner always has an incentive to set the required waste
treatment rate as high as possible and to keep the probability of control as small as possible in
order to limit the monitoring cost. The rst result is essentially linked to the entrance of poorer
and environment friendly consumers on the market when a wADF is implemented while the
second is induced by the budget constraint, i.e. a raise in the probability of control increases
the monitoring cost, hence decreases the price cut. These results are obtained with only few
restrictions on the distribution of both the willingness to pay and the desutility of the e¤ort
through agents.
These preliminary results allow us in a second step to characterize an optimal wADF policy.
We show that this system always induces a reduction of the waste management cost indepen-
dently from the monitoring cost and that the optimal policy follows from an arbitrage between
the welfare gain relative to a rise in the required waste treatment rate and the increasing moni-
toring costs. The optimal policy is also related to the average cost of the e¤ort in the population.
The paper proceeds as follows : the next section depicts our basic assumptions and describes
the wADF system. In section 3, we present the restriction on the set of contracts imposed by
the incentive, budget balancing and participation constraints. In section 4, we associate to each
feasible contract its level of welfare and give some basic properties of this function. Section
5 is devoted to construction of the optimal contract. Finally, the last section contains some
concluding remarks. The proofs of the di¤erent results are relegated to an appendix.
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2 The basic assumptions and the wADF system
In order to illustrate this question, we consider a commodity produced by a representative rm
and sold to a continuum of consumers. This consumption produces a certain amount of waste.
This end-of-pipe pollution can be, as in Choe and Fraser ([3]), considered as unit cost c while
the free individual disposal cost is of cd but it induces a social cost of cs. Of course we have
0 < cd < c < cs.
Since we mainly focus on the consumer behavior, we assume that (i) there is no way to reduce
the intrinsic waste content at the production level, (ii) waste can be recycled even partially and
(iii), one unit of good produces, to simplify, one unit of waste. We also largely simplify the
behavior of the representative rm. This one produces the commodity at a zero constant unit.
This means in other words that the competitive price p is under a standard ADF system equal
to the waste treatment cost c:
2.1 The demand side
The demand side is more detailed. We consider a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who
decide to buy or not the good, i.e. x 2 f0; 1g and choose their intensity of e¤ort e 2 [0; 1] in waste
downsizing. They share the same utility function u(x; e;m) = x  e m where m denotes the
monetary spending. Nevertheless, they are heterogeneous in respect to their willingness to pay
 2 [0; A] and their marginal cost  2 [0;] of the waste reduction e¤ort. Moreover, in order
to make sure that at least one agent is able to consume when the waste management cost is
pre-paid, we assume that A > c. In the same vein, we say that  > c otherwise all consumers
are willing to provide an e¤ort.
The distribution of these two characteristics across the population is summarized by a
probability distribution over [0; A]  [0;] whose cumulated distribution function is denoted
F (; ). This c.d.f. is assumed to be absolutely continuous with a strictly positive density
f(; ) := @2;F (; ) > 0. Moreover we denote by f(; ) :=
R 
0 f(; )d the marginal density
of  and by f(a=) := f(;)f(;) the conditional density of  given . A symmetric interpretation
holds for f(; ) and f(=).
Now remember that e¤ort reduces waste. We measure the outcome of this activity by the
proportion r(e) by which the unit waste treatment cost is reduced1. We however assume that
1This assumption particulary ts well in our discrete choice model since a consumer buys at most one unit
and therefore induces a waste treatment cost of at least c. Otherwise one should take into account the amount of
good consumed.
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there is an upper bound r  1 to this proportion and that this relation is linear, i.e. r(e) = r  e
for e 2 [0; 1] : The largest waste management cost reduction is obtained when the intensity of
the e¤ort is maximal. From that point of view we can say that e(r) = rr denotes the level of
e¤ort required to reduce the waste management cost in a proportion of r 2 [0; r]. Moreover we
assume for technical reason that cdc < r otherwise the problem becomes trivial since, as we will
see it later, the optimal policy sets r = r:
2.2 The wADF system
Within this setting a policy maker has basically two options. She can implement a crude ADF
policy by charging in advance a fee of c per unit of commodity sold by the rm. In this case, she
covers her waste treatment cost and prevents illegal dumping whose social cost cs is higher than
c. However she also dissuades all waste reduction e¤ort within the set of households which are
willing to buy the good at price c and even excludes from consuming a subset of agents which
are ready to make a waste reduction e¤ort in compensation of a price cut.
That is why we propose, in this paper, a waved Advance Disposal Fee (wADF) system. In
fact we give the policy maker the possibility to associate to the purchase of the good a contract
which species, when it is accepted, a target r of waste management cost reduction associated
to a price discount d for the buyer. This however opens the door to illegal dumping, thus we
couple this contract with a monitoring strategy. We denote by  the probability that a consumer
who accepts the contract is controlled and by c() the unit cost of a control. The ne is set
to the social cost cs of illegal deposit. Moreover we assume that this control cost is increasing
and convex (i.e. c0() > 0 and c"() < 0) and that the absence of monitoring is costless (i.e.
c(0) = 0) while perfect motoring is very expensive (i.e. c(1) > c).
The reader surely observed that a contract characterized by (r; d; ) = (0; 0; 0) coincides to
a standard ADF contract. The question in this second best world therefore becomes : is there
another contract which is better (i.e. which maximizes the surplus) and which (i) balances the
budget of the policy maker, (ii) will be accepted by at least some agents, (iii) provides enough
incentives to prevent illegal dumping ?
2.3 The choice of a consumer
These restrictions on the set of available contracts are studied in the next section; but in order
to x more notations, let us quickly come back to the set of alternatives which are open to the
households when a wADF system is implemented.
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In our discrete choice model, either a consumer of type (; ) buys nothing and her utility
is nought. If she purchases the good, she can refuse ( w) the waste reduction contract and stay
in a standard ADF. In this case, she pre-pays the cost c of waste disposal and has no incentive
to make an e¤ort. Under our zero marginal production cost assumption, she pays p = c for the
good and her utility is given by :
u
(;)
w =   c
If she accepts the contract, she obtains a discount of d, but she always has the opportunity either
to execute (e) or not (e) the terms of the contract. In the rst case she makes the required e¤ort
and delivers the transformed waste. Her utility is therefore given by :
u(;)we (r; d) =   (c  d)  e(r)
Otherwise, she makes no e¤ort and in order to mask her infringement she dumps her waste
illegally at private cost cd. She nevertheless takes the risk of being caught with probability 
and of being charged of a ne that we have set at the social cost cs of illegal dumping. She
therefore obtains :
u
(;)
we (d; ) =   (c  d)  cd   cs
From that point of view, the best strategy of a consumer of type (; ) is the one which gives
her the highest payo¤, i.e. which satises
max
n
0; u
(;)
w ; u
(;)
we (r; d); u
(;)
we (d; )
o
3 The set of feasible contracts
The main purpose of this section is to construct the contracts which can be proposed by the
policy maker and which have the property that (i) she covers both the waste management and
the monitoring costs, (ii) at least one agent is willing to participate in the waste reduction
program, and (iii) all agents who accept the contract have enough incentives to implement it,
i.e. do not use an illegal dumping strategy.
The rst constraint, as we will see it soon, dictates the price cut d conceded to the consumers.
That is why we denote by C = f(r; ) 2 [0; r] [0; 1]g the set of available contracts.
3.1 The price cut and the Budget Balancing constraint
If the requirements (ii) and (iii) are both satised, it becomes very easy to compute the price cut
d induced by a budget balancing condition. To perform this computation, let us denote by Pwe
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the proportion of consumers who accept and execute the contract and by P w the proportion of
households who keep a standard ADF system. With this convention, and since we have assumed
that there is no illegal disposal (i.e. (ii) holds), the policy maker collects the following per capita
amount of money:
t = P w  c+ Pwe  (c  d)
This tax covers the waste management and the monitoring costs. If there is no illegal disposal,
the per capita waste management costs are respectively of Pwe  (1  r)  c and of P w  c for the
households who accept or not the waste reduction contract. Under this same assumption, the
monitoring costs are pure sunk cost since no ne is collected. If we have in mind that a control is
charged at c() and that a proportion  of the households accepting the contract is monitored,
the per capita spending is given by :
s = P w  c+ Pwe  (1  r)  c+ (  Pwe)  c()
A simple budget balancing constraint therefore shows that :
Lemma 1 If there is no illegal dumping the budget balancing price cut is given by d = rc c()
So, let us now rewrite u(;)we (r; d) and u
(;)
we (d; ) as respectively :(
u
(;)
we (r; ) =   (1  r)  c    c()  e(r)
u
(;)
we (r; ) =   (1  r)  c    c()  cd   cs
3.2 The Participation Constraint
By this constraint, we mean that the contract is built in a way which ensures that at least one
buyer is willing do adopt and execute the contract. This means more formally that :
9 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] ; u(;)we (r; ) = max
n
0; u
(;)
w ; u
(;)
we (r; ); u
(;)
we (r; )
o
(PC)
Moreover if the incentive constraint is satised, i.e. the strategy we is never chosen, this condition
reduces to :
9 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] ; u(;)we (r; )  max
n
0; u
(;)
w
o
Since A > c, we know that the quantity u(;)w is positive for a set of agents which is dependent
on . This simply follows from the fact that the market is always active even in a standard
ADF system. So if the price cut d = r  c    c() is positive, we can identify in this previous
set at least one agent with a su¢ ciently small  who is willing to participate in the waste
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reduction program. The positivity of the price cut is therefore a su¢ cient condition to meet the
participation constraint but, more interestingly, it is also a necessary one. In fact we prove that:
Lemma 2 If there is no illegal dumping, the condition (PC) is equivalent to d = rc c()  0,
a non negative budget balancing price cut.
3.3 The Incentive Constraint
In this case, we have to make sure that the parameters which characterize the contract preclude
illegal waste dumping. In other words, we want that each household always prefers either to
execute the contract, to pre-pay the waste management or even not to consume. This means
more formally that :
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] , max
n
u(;)we (r; ); u
(;)
w ; 0
o
 u(;)we (r; ) (IC)
This constraint is, of course, satised when the price cut d = r c  c() associated to the waste
management contract is lower than the total cost induced by illegal dumping, tc = cd +   cs
including both the individual disposal cost and the average ne. In fact, if this condition is true,
a pre-payment system is always preferable to illegal dumping, i.e. u(;)w  u(;)we (r; ). It follows
by the denition of a maximum that (IC) is satised. Yet, we can again go a step further by
showing that this condition is not only su¢ cient but also necessary.
Lemma 3 The (IC) condition is equivalent to r  c     c()  cd +   cs, an upper bound on
the budget balancing price cut.
At that point, we are now able to precisely characterize the subset F  C of feasible contracts
satisfying simultaneously the budget balancing, the participation and the incentive constraints.
Proposition 1 The set F  C of feasible contracts is non empty and is given by :
F =

(r; ) 2 [0; r] [0; 1] :   c()
c
 r  cd
c
+
  (c() + cS)
c

It remains now to select in this set of feasible contracts the one which maximizes the average
surplus, but in order to address this question let us rst compute this quantity for all feasible
contracts and let us identify their properties.
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4 The surplus and its basic properties
In order to underline the double gain induced by a wADF system, we conduct this computation
in two steps. We rst consider the households who buy the good in both an ADF or a wADF
system and show that these agents do not get worse after the introduction of a wADF. Then,
we move to the consumers who really gain from a wADF, that is the poorer and environment
friendlyagents who gain access to the good by obtaining a price cut in compensation of their
e¤ort. The last step of this section is devoted to the properties of the total surplus.
The rst population is quite easy to identify since there willingness  to pay must be greater
than c; the competitive price charged in an ADF system. If an incentive compatible contract is
available, the subset of agents who accepts is typically given by :
C(r; ) =
n
(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] :   c and u(;)we (r; )  u(;)w
o
A simple computation shows that the second condition is equivalent to e(r)  c  r     c()
with e(r) = rr . This implies that   (r; ) := r

c  c()r

. We can therefore say that2 :
C(r; ) = f(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : c    A and 0    (r; )g
By complementation, we also observe that the households who buy the good in an ADF system
but reject the contract are given by3 :
C(r; ) = f(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : c    A and (r; )    g
It follows that the surplus of these two categories of, say Initial households, is given by :
SI(r; ) = SC(r; ) + S C(r; ) =
Z
C(r;)
u(;)we (r; )dF +
Z
C(r;)
u
(;)
w dF
=
Z A
c
 Z (r;)
0
u(;)we (r; )f(=)d +
Z 
(r;)
u
(;)
w f(=)d
!
f(; )da
and we can even observe that :
2The reader surely observed that (i) since c <  and r 2 [0; 1], we can say that (r; ) < , and (ii) for a
feasible contract d = r  c    c()  0 which implies that (r; ) > 0. The fact that  2 [0;] induces therefore
no additional constraints.
3Since we have assumed that our measure is absolutely continuous, we decide by convention to only use weak
inequalities.
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Remark 1 Since the total surplus under an ADF system is given
R A
c
R 
0 u
(;)
w dF , we can say
that these households do not get worse after the introduction of a wADF. Moreover if (r; ) > 0,
we can even say that this average surplus increases when we move from an ADF to a wADF
system. This last case occurs when the budget balancing price cut d = c  r     c() is strictly
positive.
Let us now move to the agents who really gain from the introduction of a waste management
contract. These households were initially, say, too poorto buy the good (i.e.  < c) but are
nevertheless environment friendly (i.e.  small). These consumers are ready to spend some
time to reduce her waste contain and, by doing so, reduce her cost of acquisition of the good.
This set of N ew buyers is therefore given by :
N(r; ) =
n
(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : 0    c and u(;)we (r; )  0
o
Now let us observe that the second condition is equivalent to    e(r)+ c()+(1 r) c  0.
But for these agents,  is bounded from above by c, we can therefore introduce the function
(r; ; ) := rr + c  (rc  c()) with  2 [0; (r; )] and say that :
N(r; ) = f(; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] : (r; ; )    c and 0    (r; )g
The average surplus of these new consumers is therefore given by :
SN (r; ) =
Z
C(r;)
u(;)we (r; )dF
=
Z (r;)
0
 Z c
(r;;)
u(;)we (r; )f(=)d
!
f(; )d
and we again observe that :
Remark 2 From the previous remark, we know that for a strictly positive budget balancing
price cut we have (r; ) > 0 and under the same condition, we also observe that 8 < (r; ),
(r; ; ) < 0. We can therefore assert that if the price cut c  r    c() > 0 then SN (r; ) > 0,
in other words there is a second gain induced by the introduction of an wADF system.
Let us now consider the study of the properties of the total surplus S(r; ) := SI(r; ) +
SN (r; ) on the set F of feasible contracts. If the monitoring probability  increases, the budget
balancing price cut d = c  r     c() automatically decreases. We can therefore say, at least
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from an intuitive point of view, that the welfare of the consumers who have adopted the waste
management contract decreases. The e¤ect of a change of the required waste treatment rate
r is however less obvious. On the one hand, an increase in r contributes to a higher price cut
d: This provides, for the households who buy the good, more incentives to accept the contract
and gives the opportunity to new consumers to enter the market. Yet, on the other hand, this
also implies that the consumers who accept the contract provide a higher level of e¤ort. We
nevertheless show that this increase of the e¤ort is compensated by the increase of the price cut.
More formally, we say that :
Proposition 2 Let us denote by P (r; ) :=
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;) dF the proportion of households who
accept the waste management contract and by (r; ) :=
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;) 
dF
P (r;) the average desu-
tility of the e¤ort for the households who accept the waste management contract. We observe
that :
(i) 8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @S(r; ) =  (c0() + c())P (r; ) < 0, i.e. when the
probability of control increases, the consumers surplus decreases.
(ii) 8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @rS(r; ) =

c  (r;)r

P (r; ) > 0 i.e. the surplus
increases with the required waste treatment rate r since for all consumers who accept the contract
the price cut, c  r     c() is always greater than the monetary evaluation of the e¤ort  rr , so
that c > r and also on average.
5 The optimal wADF strategy
We can nally have a look at the description of the optimal wADF policy. As usual in a second
best situation induced by the existence of illegal dumping, the social planner tries to implement
the wADF feasible contract which maximizes the total surplus, i.e. she chooses :
(r; ) 2 argmax
(r;)2F
Z
C(r;)[N(r;)
u(;)we (r; )dF +
Z
C(r;)
u
(;)
w dF| {z }
S(r;)
(1)
The reader immediately observes that this program admits a solution. In fact, F is a closed
subset of the compact set [0; r]  [0; 1], hence is compact and S(r; ) is a continuous function.
So let us now characterize this optimum.
First, let us remember, from proposition 1, that the wADF contracts which are budget
balancing, incentive compatible, and satises the participation contraint are such that :
  c()
c
 r  min

cd
c
+
  (c() + cS)
c
; r

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But from proposition 2, we also know that the average surplus is (i) increasing with r and (ii)
decreasing with . This immediately implies that (i) an optimal wADF policy has the property
that r = min
n
cd
c +
(c()+cS)
c ; r
o
and (ii) this policy cannot be such that cdc +
(c()+cS)
c > r
otherwise the policy maker has the ability to reduce  without changing r. It follows that :
r =
cd
c
+
  (c() + cS)
c
If we now set rinf :=
cd
c and construct
4 sup the probabilty of control which satises
cd
c +
sup(c(sup)+cS)
c = r, we can say that :
Proposition 3 Any optimal wADF policy (r; ) has the properties that :
(i) r  rinf > 0, i.e. this system always induces a waste reduction e¤ort on the consumers
side contrary to an ADF system. This property is even independent from the monitoring costs.
(ii)   sup, i.e. the probability of control and therefore the monitoring costs are bounded
from above. Moreover this upper bound decreases with both the illegal disposal cost cd and the
social cost cs of illegal dumping.
(iii) c  r     c() = cd +   cS, i.e the price cut obtained by the consumers is equal to
the total cost of illegal dumping (including the ne) so that the agents are indi¤erent between an
illegal dumping strategy and a legal disposal one without any e¤ort.
(iv) d = c  r   c()  cd > 0, i.e. the price cut is strictly positive, hence by remarks 1
and 2 the wADF policy striclty dominated the ADF system and "poorer environment friendly"
consumers always enter the market.
If we want to go a step further in the characterization of an optimal wADF policy, let us
take advantage of point (iii) of the preceding proposition. In fact, since the price cut must be
equal to the global cost of illegal dumping, i.e.
f(r; ) = c  r     c()  (cd +   cS) = 0
we can, by the implicite function theorem construct a relation between the probality of control
and the required waste management rate. More precisely we can say :
Remark 3 There exists a function5  : [rinf ; r]! [0; sup] with the properties that (i) f(r; (r)) =
0, (ii) ddr =
c
c0()+(c()+cS) and (iii) the graph of  belongs to F . It follows that the program
4Since (c()+cS)
c
is increasing and c(1) > c, the reader observes that the probability sup is dened.
5The reader surrely remarks that our technical assumption which says that cd
c
< r becomes crucial now. If this
assumption is not satised, the only optimal policy would be to set r = r and  = sup = 0.
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given by equation (1) can be reduced to r 2 argmax
rinfrr
S(r; (r)).
Since we know from proposition 2 the derivates of S(r; ), we can even say that :
Proposition 4 An optimal wADF policy (r; ) satises :
c 
 (r; )
r

  (  c0() + c())  d
dr

r
 0 with equality when r < r
This result tells us rst that the optimal waste treatment rate r is strictly greater than
rinf . In fact, from remark 3, we know that the probability of control (rinf) associated to rinf
is nought so that the marginal monitoring cost   c0() + c() = 0. But the average net
marginal gain of the consumers who accept the contract, ie.

c  (rinf ;0)r

is strictly positive
since the upper bound of  on which this average value is computed is r  c.
From that point of view, the social planner has always an incentive to increase the optimal
waste treatment rate above rinf , but each rate r > rinf requires an active monitoring policy that
prevents illegal dumping. The control costs then reduces, by the budget balancing constraint,
the price cut obtained by the consumers who are willing to participate in the waste management
program. It follows that the social planner will try to set the optimal waste treatment rate
r correspond to the average marginal gain minus the marginal cost induced by an increase
of the required e¤ort, i.e the quantity

c  (r;)r

is equal (or at least greater then ) to
the marginal cost of monitoring induced by a higher waste treatment rate., i.e. the quantity
(  c0() + c())  ddr

r .
6 Concluding remarks
In any case, we have shown in this paper that a policy maker never has an interest in implement
a crude ADF system on a given market . If she does it, she denitely annihilates any incentives,
at a household level, to participate in a waste management program. Whats more, she excludes
from this market some poorer consumers who are ready to participate in this program in order
to reduce the total cost of their consumption i.e. including the waste management cost. That
is why we proposed to wave this ADF system by introducing a contract which specify a waste
treatment target in counterpart to a lower disposal fee. We even couple this contract with a
monitoring technology in order to prevent illegal dumping. In this context, we have checked
that feasable contracts, i.e. satisfying a Budget Balancing, an Incentive and a Participation
constraints, exist and that an optimal contract in this set always increases the welfare of the
consumers in respect to a simple ADF system.
13
This paper however remains particular in several respects. First of all, we have mainly
focused our attention on the households and looked at the waste management policy as a treat-
ment of end-of-pipepollution. So by highlighting our main argument, we neglect not only the
question of the incentives which could be given to the rms in order to reduce the waste contain
of their products but also the existence of potential recycling methods which lead to a partial
reintroduction of the waste in the production process. We leave these points to future works.
As usual in this litterature, we have also assumed that the market of the good under con-
sideration works competitively. The results surely change under imperfect competition. In this
case, the optimal design of the contract should not only take into account the waste management
issue but also the e¤ects of this contract on the market power. More preciselly we have shown
that a wADF system dominates a ADF policy since new consumers have the opportunity to
enter the market. Yet, in a context of imperfect competition this also modies the elasticity of
the demand and has therefore an impact on the market power.
Finally, even if our argument requires no specic assumption on the distribution of the
characteristics though agents and remains quite general from that point of view, we have assumed
that the relation between the e¤ort and the cost reduction rate is linear. It could perhaps be
interesting to consider more general functions which characterize this relation.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of lemma 1
Obvious
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B Proof of lemma 2
Let us rst observe that if r  c    c()  0 then for  = 0, we have :
u(;0)we (r; ) =   c+ r  c    c()    c = u(;0)w
Since A > c, it remains to choose  = A in order to observe that u(A;0)we (r; )  u(A;0)w  0. Without illegal
dumping there exists therefore (; ) = (A; 0) such that PC is true.
Now let us suppose that r  c     c() < 0; then 8 2 [0;], r  c     c()    r
r
< 0. Since e(r) = r
r
, this
implies 8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;],
u(;)we (r; ) =   c+ r  c    c()  e(r) <   c = u(;)w
By the denition of a maximum, this also means that :
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] , max
n
0; u
(;)
w ; u
(;)
we (r; ); u
(;)
we (r; )
o
> u(;)we (r; )
But this contradicts (PC)
C Proof of lemma 3
If r  c  cd +   cs +   c() holds then
8 2 [0; A] u(;)w =   c    (1  r)  c    c()  cd   cs = u(;)we (r; )
and, by the denition of a maximum, we can conclude that :
8 (; ) 2 [0; A] [0;] ; max
n
u(;)we (r; ); u
(;)
w ; 0
o
 u(;)we (r; )
Now assume that r  c > cd +   cs +   c(). By a similar argument as before, we can now say that 8 2 [0; A],
u
(;)
w < u
(;)
we (r; ). Since c < A, if we set  = A, we can say that :
8 2 [0;] ; u(A;)we (r; ) > max
n
u
(A;)
w ; 0
o
Moreover under the same assumption we have that r  c > cd +   cs since   c()  0. It follows that 8 2 [0;],
A  (1  r)  c    c()  (cd +   cs) > A  (1  r)  c    c()  r
r
 (r  c)
Since  > c; e(r) = r
r
and r  1, we deduce that
u
(A;)
we (r; ) = A  (1  r)  c    c()  (cd +   cs) > A  (1  r)  c    c()   e(r) = u(A;)we (r; )
By putting all the previous results together, we conclude that :
9 (; ) = (A;), u(A;)we (r; ) > max
n
u(A;)we (r; ); u
(A;)
w ; 0
o
But this contradicts (IC)
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D Proof of proposition 1
This is a direct consequence of lemmata 1,2 and 3
E Proof of proposition 2
This computation is a tedious exercise since S(r; ) = SI(r; ) + SN (r; ) with8<: SI(r; ) =
R (r;)
0
R A
c
u
(;)
we (r; )  f(=)d

f(; )d + R 
(r;)
R A
c
u
(;)
w  f(=)d

f(; )d
SN (r; ) =
R (r;)
0
R c
(r;;)
u
(;)
we (r; )f(=)d

f(; )d
But the reader observes that r and  work in a rather similar way. So if x stand either for r and , we obtain
that :
@xS(r; ) = @xSI(r; ) + @xSN (r; ) =Z A
c
u(;)we (r; )  f(=)d

f(; )

=(r;)
 @x(r; ) (2a)
+
Z (r;)
0
Z A
c
@xu
(;)
we (r; )  f(=)d

f(; )d (2b)
 
Z A
c
u
(;)
w  f(=)d

f(; )

=(r;)
 @x(r; ) (2c)
+
  Z c
(r;;)
u(;)we (r; )f(=)d
!
f(; )
!
=(r;)
 @x(r; ) (2d)
+
Z (r;)
0
 Z c
(r;;)
@xu
(;)
we (r; )f(=)d 

u(;)we (r; )f(=)

=(r;;)
@x(r; ; )
!
f(; )d
(2e)
Since (r; ) = r

c  c()
r

and (r; ; ) := r
r
+ c  (rc  c()), we also remark that :
8>><>>:
(i) u(;)we (r; )

=(r;)
=   (1  r)  c    c()  r

c  c()
r

r
r
=   c = u(;)w

=(r;)
(ii) (r; ; )j=(r;) = r

c  c()
r

r
r
+ c  (rc  c()) = c
(iii) u(;)we (r; )

=(r;;)
=  r
r
+ c  (rc  c())  (1  r)  c    c()   r
r
= 0
By (i) the rst (2a) and the third (2c) term in the preceding sum simplify, by (ii) the fourth term (2d) is zero,
and (iii) simplies the last term (2e). We can therefore say that :
@xS(r; ) =
Z (r;)
0
 Z A
(r;;)
@xu
(;)
we (r; )  f(=)d
!
f(; )d
Now remember that @u
(;)
we (r; ) =  (c0() + c()) < 0 for all  > 0 and that the only feasible contract
for which  = 0 is (r; ) = (0; 0), we can therefore say that :
8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @S(r; ) =  (c0() + c())
Z (r;)
0
Z A
(r;;)
dF < 0
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where
R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;)
dF = P (r; ) the proportion of households who accept the waste management contract.
This proves (i) of proposition 2.
Let us move to (ii) of proposition 2. Since e(r) = r
r
, we observe that @ru
(;)
we (r; ) = c   r . Moreover
8 < (r; ) =: r

c  c()
r

, we can say that :
c  
r
> c  r

c    c()
r

1
r
=
  c()
r
 0
This implies that :
8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @rS(r; ) =
Z (r;)
0

c  
r
 Z A
(r;;)
f(=)d
!
f(; )d > 0
Now let us denote by
(r; ) :=
Z (r;)
0

R A
(r;;)
f(=)d

R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;)
dF
f(; )d
the average desutility of the e¤ort for the households who accept the waste management contract. This yields :
8(r; ) 2 F and (r; ) 6= (0; 0), @rS(r; ) =

c 
(r; )
r

P (r; )
F Proof of proposition 3
Obvious
G Proof of proposition 4
By remark 3, we know that the search of an optimal contract reduces to the search of a waste reduction rate
which satises
r 2 argmax
rinfrr
S(r; (r)):
From that point of view any optimal solution satises the following Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions :8><>:
@rS(r; (r)) + @S(r; (r))
d
dr
+ 1   2 = 0
1 (rmin   r) = 0 rmin   r  0 1  0
2 (r   r) = 0 r   r  0 2  0
where 1 and 2 are the Lagrangian multiplicators associated to the constraints rmin   r  0 and r   r  0 and
@rS(r; ) =

c 
(r; )
r

P (r; )
@S(r; ) =  (c0() + c())P (r; )
d
dr
=
c
  c0() + (c() + cS)
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Since we have assumed that cd
c
< r both constraints cannot be binding. So if the rst constraint is binding, i.e.
r = rmin then 2 = 0. But in this case  = (rmin) = 0 and the rst order condition becomes :
c 
(rmin; 0)
r

P (rmin; 0) + 1 = 0
Let us now observe that (rmin; 0) := rc > 0. This implies that P (rmin; 0) =
R rc
0
R A
rmin
r
+c(1 rmin) dF R rc
0
R A
c
dF > 0 and that (rmin; 0) :=
R rc
0
dG < rc where G() = probability [t  =contract is accepted]. It
follows that 1 < 0 which is a contradiction.
Let us now move to a pure interior solution. In this case r 2 ]rmin; r[ and 1 = 2 = 0. it follows that :
c 
(r; )
r
  (c0() + c())d
dr

P (r; ) = 0
But by proposition 3, we know that the optimal price cut d = rc c() is strictly positive. As a consequence
we can say that at the optimum (r; ) := r

c  c()
r

> 0 and 8  (r; ), (r; ; ) := r
r
+ c  
(rc  c())  c. This implies that P (r; ) := R (r;)
0
R A
(r;;) dF 
R (r;)
0
R A
c
dF > 0. So if the
optimal strategy r 2 ]rmin; r[ we have :
c 
(r; )
r
  (c0() + c())d
dr
= 0
It remains to consider the last case in which the second constraint is binding (i.e. r = r). This implies that (i)
 = (r) = sup and (ii) 1 = 0 since both constraints cannot be binding. Moreover with a same argument as
before we can say that P (r; ) > 0. Since 2  0, we can conclude that if (r; ) = (r; sup) is an optimum
then
c 
(r; sup)
r
  (supc0(sup) + c(sup))d
dr
= 2  0
By putting together all these results, we can conclude that an optimal wADF policy (r; ) satises :
c 
 (r; )
r

  (  c0() + c())  d
dr

r
 0 with equality when r < r
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